Analysis of Warrant Attacks on Some Threshold Proxy Signature Schemes


Samaneh Mashhadi, Journal of Information Processing Systems Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 249-262, Apr. 2016  

10.3745/JIPS.03.0050
Keywords: Non-Repudiation, Proxy Signature Scheme, Signature Scheme, Threshold Proxy Signature, Unforgeability
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Abstract

In 2004, Yang et al. proposed a threshold proxy signature scheme that efficiently reduced the computational complexity of previous schemes. In 2009, Hu and Zhang presented some security leakages of Yang’s scheme and proposed an improvement to eliminate the security leakages that had been pointed out. In this paper, we will point out that both Yang and Hu’s schemes still have some security weaknesses, which cannot resist warrant attacks where an adversary can forge valid proxy signatures by changing the warrant . We also propose two secure improvements for these schemes.


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Cite this article
[APA Style]
Samaneh Mashhadi (2016). Analysis of Warrant Attacks on Some Threshold Proxy Signature Schemes. Journal of Information Processing Systems, 12(2), 249-262. DOI: 10.3745/JIPS.03.0050.

[IEEE Style]
S. Mashhadi, "Analysis of Warrant Attacks on Some Threshold Proxy Signature Schemes," Journal of Information Processing Systems, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 249-262, 2016. DOI: 10.3745/JIPS.03.0050.

[ACM Style]
Samaneh Mashhadi. 2016. Analysis of Warrant Attacks on Some Threshold Proxy Signature Schemes. Journal of Information Processing Systems, 12, 2, (2016), 249-262. DOI: 10.3745/JIPS.03.0050.